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REVIEWING THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
(PART II) 
PRIORITIES FOR SHORT-TERM IMPLEMENTATION 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
CO-CHAIRMEN: DAVID HONE & LASSE NORD 
RAPPORTEURS: CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER & NORIKO FUJIWARA 
Executive Summary 
his report constitutes Part II of the CEPS Task Force Report on Reviewing the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Part I was presented to the UK Presidency on 7 July 2005,
1 
and subsequently published on the CEPS website.
2 It focused on a number of short-term 
implementation issues linked to the second round of allocation, including transparency 
requirements of the National Allocation Plans (NAPs), the definition of installations, treatment 
of small installations, new entrants, closure and transfer rules, allocation methodologies, the 
possibility of opt-ins as well as monitoring, reporting and verification. Part II examines deep-
seated issues such as economic impact and effects on investment as well as the potential 
inclusion of aviation. These issues are expected to have a major influence on the second phase 
of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2008-12. 
After reporting on the status of the ETS and reviewing its fundamental objectives in sections 1 
and 2, the following sections cover investment incentives (3), competitiveness (4 and 5) and 
aviation (6). The main findings of the report are presented in this Executive Summary, 
containing Key Messages & Recommendations and an extended Full Summary.  
I.  Key Messages & Recommendations 
Although there has been some progress in implementing the EU ETS, it remains a work in 
progress in many respects with critical elements of the infrastructure still under creation. As of 
December 2005, oonly around two-thirds of the 25 national registries were in place, the 
installation level allocations had not yet been decided in several member states, implementation 
of the International Transaction Log was still far from complete and the member states were 
taking only the most hesitant steps towards transposing the Linking Directive into national law. 
Moreover, governance issues affecting the UN CDM Executive Board have hindered the inflow 
of CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) credits to the EU. This delay comes at a time of an 
increased spread between coal and gas prices, but so far power plants have continued to burn 
more coal, thereby causing CO2 prices to climb. Since fuel switching – from coal to gas – is a 
principal way to reduce CO2 emissions in the short term, an increased use of coal has a major 
impact on allowance prices. While the lack of infrastructure generally inhibits trading activity 
and efficient price-setting, for the EU allowance market it has generally meant it was mainly the 
power sector, which is short due to allocation and the coal/gas price spread, that has engaged in 
the trading market. The industrial sector – generally long – has been less engaged in the market. 
In addition, most active trading participants come from those member states with tighter 
                                                 
1 See http://www.ceps.be/files/EUETSLondonLaunch070705.pdf 
2 See http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1288 
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allocation, and hence are buyers. In addition, market participants from those countries with less 
tight allocation, i.e. potential sellers from mainly but not only the new member states, have not 
yet engaged in trading as a result of a lack of infrastructure and in some cases, the absence of 
installation-level allocation.  
 
Completion of the trading infrastructure  
 
1.  It is important that the missing infrastructure of the EU ETS, such as registries and the 
International Transaction Log, comes into operation as soon as possible. Otherwise, supply, 
notably but not exclusively from new member states, or CDM will be hampered.  
Recommendation 1.  Priority must be given to putting all registries in place.  
Recommendation 2.  The Linking Directive should be transposed into national law and 
implemented by mid-2006 at the latest. 
Recommendation 3.  The International Transaction Log should be operational by the end 
of 2006. 
Recommendation 4.  The reform of the CDM Executive Board must ensure a greater flow 
of CDM credits available for use in the EU ETS.  
[See Full Summary, “Introduction” and “Options to create investment incentives”, items 2 
& 13.]  
 
Cost-effectiveness  
 
2.  The EU ETS will ultimately be judged on whether it will be able to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in a cost-effective way. It is essential that the EU ETS achieves its objectives in 
order to demonstrate to other countries that greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced 
without damaging the economy. For the second round of National Allocation Plans (NAPs), 
it will be of critical importance that member states develop strategies to ensure that 
compliance costs for all sectors are more or less the same.  
Recommendation 5.  The second round of National Allocation Plans must reflect the 
trajectories of current and planned overall greenhouse emissions for 
each member state, including information on all sectors, whether or 
not they are covered in the ETS. This should be guided by a 
philosophy that abatement costs for the individual sectors are by and 
large the same. Data should be presented to show the planned 
emissions reductions as well as the use of credits from the Kyoto 
mechanisms. 
[See Full Summary, “Existing climate change targets”, items 4 & 5.] 
 
Optimisation of EU ETS implementation 
3.  In many respects, the EU ETS has been close to an economist’s ideal structure for an 
emissions trading scheme, whereas in other respects, it differs significantly. Short-term 
allocation periods, grandfathering combined with changing the baseline year (i.e. updating)
3 
                                                 
3 Grandfathering potentially allocates economic rents that may result in windfall profits (if opportunity 
costs are passed through) or social inefficiencies (if it does not result in the internalisation of external PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW – PART II | 3 
and the lack of consistency between member states with regard to allocation methodologies 
may undermine efficiency and especially effectiveness, and create distortions between 
different participants. Of particular importance for the optimisation of the ETS is the review 
of possible allocation mechanisms, including benchmarking and auctioning, and especially 
by avoiding updating. In addition, the short-term targets of current allocation rules 
disconnect target-setting from the investment cycle, heightening fears that the EU ETS 
inhibits rather than fosters investment. If the EU ETS is to become a global showcase, these 
issues need to be addressed. 
Recommendation 6.  The EU and the member states should address the issue of investment 
incentives immediately, starting with the second National Allocation 
Plans. Member states should review the numerous existing proposals 
and measures that could increase investment certainty. Incentives for 
investment should become more closely aligned between different 
member states.  
Recommendation 7.  Member states must avoid updating, i.e. allocation based on historical 
emissions based on a changing (updated) reference year. 
Recommendation 8.  If benchmarks are considered, member states should apply i) 
consistent rules across member states on the types of benchmarks to 
be used (e.g. fuel, technology or product-specific) and ii) consistent 
methods of measure (e.g. installed capacity, projected utilisation 
rates, projected output or best available technology and techniques, 
sometimes referred to as BATNEEC
4). 
Recommendation 9.  Should auctioning be considered in conjunction with the recycling of 
revenues, there is a need to set clear rules for the mechanics well in 
advance, including the timing and frequency of auctioning, the 
potential necessity for EU-wide auctioning, the number of 
allowances, participation rules and how to recycle the revenues.  
[See Full Summary, “Investment uncertainty” and “Options to create investment 
incentives”, items 6 & 7] 
 
Competitiveness 
4.  The EU ETS seeks to minimise costs. Nevertheless, meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets 
does entail costs. Since major competitor companies outside the EU are not subject to a 
similar carbon constraint, EU industry is placed at a competitive disadvantage.  
a.  There is both theoretical and empirical evidence that some energy-intensive industries 
are negatively affected by the EU ETS. The aluminium industry, for example, reports a 
considerable additional cost increase, representing on average more than 10% of its 
sales revenues. For the cement sector, additional costs at a CO2 price of €20 to €25 per 
tonne are about the same as total fixed costs of cement production. This might lead to a 
loss of export markets. The steel industry may face a similar situation, especially when 
the global boom slows down.  
                                                                                                                                               
costs). As concluded in a previous CEPS Task Force (Egenhofer, Fujiwara & Gialoglou, 2005), 
grandfathering may be justified in the initial stages of the EU ETS on grounds of protecting investments 
that predate the EU ETS. However, if continued by merely changing the reference year, i.e. updating, 
there is little incentive for companies to cut emissions. 
4 Best available technology, not entailing excessive costs. 4 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
b.  There is no doubt that power prices have increased. However, power prices are 
influenced by many factors, of which the EU ETS is but one. In general, it is difficult to 
assess the impact of CO2 allowance prices as these are determined by a variety of 
factors, including fuel prices, available generation capacity, weather conditions and 
imports or market expectations. Even the extent to which CO2 prices are passed through 
to power prices varies by market, load factor and the power market in question. The EU 
ETS’ objective was to include the CO2 price in the marginal cost of power. While this 
may push up power prices, it may also exert further downward pressure on coal and 
hence fuel prices to keep coal competitive on the EU power market. The increase in the 
price differential between coal and gas compels power plants to burn more coal and 
push up EU allowance prices. In addition, current allocation rules act as a disincentive 
to close inefficient plants, and allow windfall profits for the power sector, which are 
possible because of a lack of competition and owing to distortions in EU power 
markets.  
This report analyses a number of options to address competitiveness impacts for the sectors 
that are significantly affected. However, there seems no ideal option to address implications. 
Two different categories have been identified: The first category is ‘alleviation’ measures. 
They aim at changing the incentive structure and the functioning of the allowance market 
essentially through regulation. Attention is needed to ensure that such measures do not 
impede efficiency of the EU ETS, power or other markets. The second category consists of 
‘compensation’ measures, in principle executed through recycling of revenues, allocation or 
subsidies. They try to correct undesirable economic and social outcomes from the trading 
market. They raise issues on the organisation of this compensation (i.e. allocation, raising 
and distribution of funds), notably, how to minimise government intervention. Measures 
from both categories may have unintended consequences.  
Recommendation 10.  Since the competitiveness effect of the EU ETS is critical for future 
development, any discussion about it must be continued and 
ultimately satisfactorily settled. The European Commission should 
take the lead in identifying, together with member states and in 
consultation with the covered industry and other stakeholders, 
possibilities to address the issue. Rather than comparing no regulation 
with participation in the EU ETS, a useful analysis would assess the 
impact of realistic alternative policy instruments. It should also take 
into account the economic impacts of the different covered sectors, 
i.e. power sector or industrial sectors.  
Recommendation 11.  If measures have to be taken, preference should be given to 
compensation measures that try to correct undesirable outcomes and 
that minimise the role of government. Policy-makers must pay 
attention to avoid creating inefficiencies and distortions in other 
markets, notably EU power markets or unintended consequences. 
[See Full Summary, “Competitiveness” and “Options to address competitiveness issues”, 
items 8 to 19.] 
 
Aviation 
5.  Including aviation in the ETS raises many questions, such as non-CO2 impacts, common 
metrics and issues related to allocation. The practical resolution of most of these issues is a 
necessary prerequisite for linking the air transport sector with the EU ETS, even on a CO2-
only basis. Even if they can be solved, the most critical issue is ensuring that aviation will PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW – PART II | 5 
remain a net buyer. Although expected demand from aviation is estimated to be between 1-
2% of total allocated allowances, this would however constitute the amount of allowances 
by which the market is currently considered to be short. The price effect could be 
considerable. This demand will even be considerably higher in case radiative forcing is 
taken into account. 
Recommendation 12. Full inclusion of aviation in the ETS should only be undertaken if all 
identified technical issues – such as certainty of the full impact of 
aviation on the climate, common metrics for measuring non-CO2 
impacts, effects of radiative forcing, the choice of a base year, or the 
definition of new entrants – have satisfactorily been settled. 
Recommendation 13. Allocation must not create perverse incentives for airlines.  
Recommendation 14. The EU and member states should further study the economic impact 
on the sectors already covered.  
[See Full Summary, “Aviation”, items 20 to 24.] 
II.  Full Summary  
Part I of this report discussed a number of short-term implementation issues and outlined how 
they could progressively be addressed during the second round of National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs phase II). Addressing short-term implementation issues, which are central to the 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity of the EU ETS on its own, however, may not be enough. 
The EU ETS raises a number of fundamental issues that influence the behaviour in the second 
phase. These are discussed in this Part II report. 
 
Introduction 
 
1.  The objective of the EU ETS was to reduce GHG emissions in a cost-effective way. 
Meeting the environmental objective in a cost-effective way would not only minimise the 
competitive impact on EU industry but also demonstrate that emissions reductions can be 
achieved without damaging the economy. If the ETS were to be successful, it would ideally 
facilitate the engagement of other countries to participate in similar trading schemes now 
and especially after the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012.  
2.  Ultimately, cost-effectiveness will depend on the actual market architecture, comprising 
both design (e.g. directives) and implementation practice, such as NAPs, and the trading 
infrastructure. Major parts of the implementation, such as the creation of registries or 
transposition of the Linking Directive are still missing in many member states, thereby 
hampering the market. At international level, the absence for some time to come of the 
International Transactions Log, and the problems the CDM Executive Board has in 
processing CDM projects, continue to hold back liquidity in the EU allowance market.  
3.  At the same time, the EU ETS has caused distributional effects between sectors, which 
portend serious negative impacts on competitiveness for some energy-intensive sectors. 
These are mainly related to allocation and the effects of power prices. Member states have 
attempted to address these concerns in the allocation process. This is reflected in the overall 
shortage of allowances for the power sector throughout the EU, whereas other sectors are 
overall long. However, the benefits for the manufacturing sectors should not be over-
estimated and the non-covered sectors, such as aluminium or chemicals, do not benefit from 
this ‘generous’ allocation at all. Ways will also need to be found for creating investment 6 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
incentives for low or zero-carbon technologies, both in the power and manufacturing 
sectors.  
Existing climate change targets 
4.  After the (near) completion of all first-round NAPs, which obliged member states to 
develop strategies to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets, it is now clear that many member 
states are not on track to meet these targets. This shortfall needs to be addressed in the 
second round of allocation. It is important to distribute the burden across all sectors, both 
those included and those not included in the ETS, such that overall abatement costs are 
minimised. Otherwise, overall compliance costs will increase as many low-cost abatement 
possibilities would be missed, as has been suggested by the European Climate Change 
Programme.  
5.  Alternatively, the gap in reaching the target could be compensated for by credits from the 
Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms – Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). However, as there is major uncertainty about the 
availability of such credits, member states may have to resort to the purchase of AAUs 
(Assigned Amount Units). Both, however, might be limited by ‘supplementarity’ provisions 
in the Kyoto Protocol and the Linking Directive, and will also entail significant expenditure 
by governments, the money for which will have to be collected through taxes. 
Investment uncertainty  
6.  In the long-term, a critical element for meeting the climate change challenge will be 
investment in new and carbon-friendly technologies. Such investment can be facilitated by a 
greater degree of certainty, but certainty is reduced by a number of factors, some of which 
are beyond the EU’s control.  
a)  Beyond the EU’s control, for example, are both the nature of commitments and the 
structure of a future global agreement, but also the impact of the Linking Directive in 
the period to 2012. 
b)  The EU ETS adds to investment uncertainty. The main causes are the possible 
depletion of new entrants’ reserves and short-term allocation, which provides 
certainty for only three, and then five years – periods that are far shorter than those 
associated with investment cycles. In the first round of allocation, it has become clear 
that the considerable degree of member state discretion in allocation has put pressure 
on member states to not treat industry any more harshly than the treatment meted out 
in other member states (see Part I). Hence, the final allocations reflect a strong 
element of the negotiations between member state governments and industry 
combined with an element of ‘willingness to pay’. 
 
Options to create investment incentives  
7.  There have been discussions on how to create greater stability and predictability for the 
covered sectors of the EU ETS. This report has reviewed a number of options including 
allocation-related solutions (e.g. a 14-year guaranteed allocation based on fuel-specific 
benchmarks in the Geram NAP I), the alignment of targets with the investment cycle by 
using for example long-term efficiency targets as a basis for setting a cap for the PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW – PART II | 7 
manufacturing industry, benchmarks and auctioning, or the so-called ‘ten-year rule’
5 or 
long-term indicative targets.  
a)  Rules for new entry and closures can be designed to add more certainty. Nevertheless, 
they run up against the fact that the Directive has foreseen multiple short allocation 
periods, making it difficult to extend certainty beyond these periods. 
b)  There is strong interest and support among member states to further analyse and 
develop benchmarks (see also the Part I report). In order to do so, there is a need to 
ensure: i) consistency across member states on both the types of benchmarks (e.g. 
fuel, technology or product-specific) and the metrics to apply (e.g. installed capacity, 
projected utilisation rates, projected output or best available technology and 
techniques, sometimes also referred to as BATNEEC) and ii) data availability.  
c)  Long-term efficiency targets for the manufacturing industry, for example based on 
benchmarks, are another potential way to increase long-term certainty for the sector. 
The principal item is how such a system could be incorporated into the EU ETS, 
which operates on absolute caps. Setting relative targets would transform the ETS 
into a baseline and credit scheme, which is not foreseen under the Directive. Hence, 
this would require a change of the Directive, and therefore becomes a topic for the 
2006 formal review. However, nothing would stop member states from basing their 
allocation to the energy-intensive sectors on long-term efficiency targets.  
d)  Using auctioning in combination with recycling of revenues has also been proposed 
as a possible way to create investment incentives as it is thought that it would create a 
more reliable forward curve, and hence clearer price signals. The downside is that 
auctioning would have a negative impact on costs, thereby affecting the 
competitiveness (i.e. profits, market share) of energy-intensive industries. In addition, 
this would open a ‘secondary allocation’ debate on how to recycle revenues and raise 
questions on the mechanisms of auctioning. The current Directive, however, only 
foresees limited auctioning, i.e. a maximum of 10% of the allowances for the second 
phase. Any higher degree of auctioning would require a change in the Directive.  
e)  A so-called ‘ten-year rule’ has been proposed to balance efficiency considerations, 
including investment, with perceived issues of fairness. This concept attempts to 
acknowledge the need both to compensate incumbent installations for sunk costs and 
to not discriminate against new entrants for reasons of fairness. It can be used for both 
emissions and performance-based allocation. The main criticism has been the risk that 
insufficient reserves of new entrants would deter new investment. 
f)  To provide a signal to the power sector, the idea has been proposed to develop long-
term indicative targets for the EU as a whole, or, if more appropriate, for the relevant 
national or regional markets. In order for such an indicative target to serve its 
purpose, it would require extending them far beyond the short-term allocation 
periods. This would imply, however, that member states develop energy strategies on 
how to arrive at the needed reductions. Another issue is the legal nature of such 
indicative targets. Non-binding targets have very often been of little practical effect, 
as can be seen from the EU energy efficiency targets in the 1980s, or more recently, 
                                                 
5 Under the Ten-Year Rule (see 3.5), a member state will allocate allowances based on the average of, say, 
three reference years (e.g. 2000-2002) for 10 years. After ten years, the reference years would be updated 
on a rolling basis, i.e. from 2000-02 to 2001-03, etc. Hence, there is some compensation for sunk costs 
but not forever. A new entrant would receive allowances from a reserve according to emission rate 
benchmarks (to be standardised across the EU member states). 8 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
from ‘soft’ targets agreed under the Lisbon agenda. In order to be effective, targets 
could be attached to a revised EU ETS, in much the same way that indicative targets 
have been formulated in the Annex of the Renewables Directive. Long-term certainty 
would be helped by a common EU energy policy.  
 
Competitiveness  
8.  The potential economic impact of the ETS can either stem from the need to cover process 
emissions – not covered by free allocation – or power price increases. The actual impact on 
each sector or installation then depends on: i) a sector’s ability to pass through costs in 
different product markets, ii) geography (i.e. the proximity of competitors) and iii) the 
structure of national or regional power markets. In an increasingly globalised economy, 
however, analysis shows that moderate increases in production costs will have long-term 
implications for the investment patterns of all affected industries over the medium term by 
freezing new capacity. 
9.  The most controversial issue has been power prices, but power prices are influenced by 
many factors, of which the EU ETS is but one. In general it is difficult to assess the impact 
of CO2 allowance prices, as these are determined by a large variety of factors, including fuel 
prices, available generation capacity, euro/dollar exchange rates, investment costs, power 
imports, weather conditions, heat demand (‘must runs’), the flexibility of gas contracts as 
well as market expectations and more. Even the extent to which CO2 prices are passed 
through to power prices varies by market, load factor and the power market in question.  
10. The objective of the EU ETS was to include the CO2 price in the marginal costs of power. 
While the ETS is likely to push up power prices, it may at the same time reduce coal prices. 
It must also be noted that the EU ETS was launched at a time of very high energy prices, 
which has influenced power prices. In addition, high gas prices make power plants continue 
to burn more coal and push up EU allowance prices. This is coupled with the fact that 
current allocation rules provide for disincentives to close inefficient plants, and allow for 
potential windfall profits for the power sector, which are possible because of a lack of 
competition and because of distortions in EU power markets.  
11. Given that the EU ETS started only as of 1 January 2005, the market is still immature. 
Moreover, major essential parts of the trading infrastructure are still missing. Less than two-
thirds of the 25 registries are in place and in a few member states the installation level 
allocations have not yet been decided. The International Transaction Log is expected to be 
missing for some time while member states make rather hesitant steps towards 
implementing the Linking Directive, hampering the supply of credits from outside the EU. 
A second important factor for the EU allowance market has been the increased spread 
between coal and gas prices. In the short term, fuel switching – from coal to gas – is the 
principle way to reduce CO2 emissions. However, the coal/gas spread increase has made 
power plants continue to burn more coal, which in turn has made CO2 prices climb. While 
the lack of infrastructure generally inhibits trading activity and efficient price-setting, for 
the EU allowance market it has generally meant it was mainly the power sector, which is 
short due to allocation and the coal/gas price spread, that has engaged in the trading market. 
The industrial sector – generally long – has been less active in the trading market. In 
addition, most active trading participants come from those member states with tighter 
allocation, and hence are buyers. On the other hand, market participants from those 
countries with less tight allocation, i.e. potential sellers from mainly but not only the new 
member states, have not yet engaged in trading as a result of a lack of infrastructure and in 
some cases, the absence of installation level allocation.  PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW – PART II | 9 
Options to address competitiveness issues 
12. The first step should be to complete the trading infrastructure. This refers to the operation of 
registries, the International Transaction Log, completion of installation level allocation as 
well as the transposition and implementation of the Linking Directive. Completion of the 
infrastructure will increase trading activity by allowing all potential market participants to 
take part in the EU allowance market. This should increase liquidity and more generally the 
efficiency of the allowance market. 
13. In addition, this report distinguishes between two broad categories of measures: i) 
‘alleviation measures’, designed to ease the impacts and ii) ‘compensation’ measures 
through allocation, recycling of revenues or subsidies. Measures can aim at reducing either 
the CO2 or the power price. 
 
A) Alleviation  measures   
14. Alleviation measures to ease impacts attempt to reduce the effects of the ETS on the 
affected sectors by changing the incentive structure of the ETS and hence company 
decisions. There is a risk that distortions will emerge in the EU power or other markets, and 
hence, they need to be carefully analysed.  
15. The following alleviation measures have been considered: 
a)  Some have argued that the auctioning of allowances, as long as it is combined with 
revenue recycling, could be a suitable way to address the competitiveness issue. 
Auctioning ensures that all participants are treated in the same way. In addition, it is 
preferable from an efficiency point of view and reflects the ‘polluter-pays’ principle. 
Finally, it generates revenues to be recycled to address public policy objectives, such 
as reduction of other taxes, or to address market distortions. The disadvantages on the 
other hand are well-known: it increases the cost for participating industries and is 
comparable to a tax and hence enjoys little political acceptability. Recycling of 
revenues can mitigate these effects, but it is not evident how to do this efficiently. It 
then becomes a matter of the management of a ‘secondary allocation’. Of particular 
concern are internal market issues and the role of the EU but also the impact on 
companies’ cash flow. Most important, however, is the temporary limitation of 
auctioning under the current Directive, i.e. 5% and 10% maximum, for the first and 
second period respectively. While some have argued that the Directive would allow 
for a higher level of auctioning as long as it is accompanied by full recycling, the 
issue would almost certainly have to be settled by the European Court of Justice. 
Furthermore, using 100% auctioning would lead to higher power prices as a result of 
full-cost pass through. For the medium and longer term, this would lead to a shift to 
less carbon-intensive fuels, most likely gas. Such a shift to gas could further increase 
import dependency on mainly Russian gas, potentially increasing risks associated 
with security of supply. The effects of higher power prices of course could be offset 
by the revenue recycling, depending on the exact rules for recycling. 
b)  Limiting the CO2  allowance price has sometimes been mentioned as a possible 
measure. This could be done for example by relaxing the overall cap of the covered 
sector or by encouraging the influx of CDM and JI credits into the EU ETS as a result 
of the Linking Directive. Relaxing the overall cap implies that emissions reductions 
will have to be undertaken by other sectors – given the Kyoto Protocol’s targets – 
which is likely to increase overall compliance costs for member states, as low-cost 
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compensating for the relaxing of the overall cap by member states using the Kyoto 
Protocol’s project mechanisms (i.e. CDM/JI credits) is likely to run against current 
political, technical and other constraints related to those mechanisms. While the EU 
can attempt to address them, it will need the cooperation of all international partners 
in the UNFCCC. Encouraging the influx of CDM/JI credits through the Linking 
Directive faces the same difficulties. The purchase of AAUs by member states, as an 
alternative, might be politically difficult unless such AAUs are ‘greened’ through for 
example the Green Investment Scheme (GIS), which earmarks revenues from the sale 
of excess AAUs for projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Ultimately, the 
use of flexible mechanisms finds its limit in the Kyoto Protocol’s and the Linking 
Directive’s supplementary provisions. Another option that has been discussed to limit 
the CO2 price is to set a maximum price on an EU allowance, but this does not seem 
to be a viable option for the second period (2008-12) as the current Directive does not 
allow the setting of a maximum price. Moreover, setting a maximum price risks 
missing the environmental objective of the covered sector with the consequence that 
reductions would have to be achieved by other sectors, which would increase overall 
compliance costs. Another downside of setting a maximum price is that it would 
reduce liquidity and therefore may actually undermine trading activity and so could 
be seen as ‘managing a market’. 
c)  Another possible measure that has been discussed is a system of allocation  of 
emissions allowances based on relative quota or a Performance Standard Rate (PSR) 
such as an energy/carbon efficiency benchmark per unit of output. A benchmark 
could be multiplied by the expected output to determine the allowance ex-ante or 
alternatively, multiplied by the realised output, i.e. with ex-post adjustment. The 
major advantages are that it would virtually avoid windfall profits, reward carbon 
efficiency and be popular with industry since it is less restrictive of economic growth. 
There are a number of shortcomings, however: lower economic efficiency, less 
environmental certainty and higher information and other transaction costs. The 
principal issue is that a relative quota system does not fit into the present Directive 
(and the political consensus) and hence could not be implemented before 2012.  
 
B)   Compensation measures 
16. Compensation measures attempt to correct undesirable effects of the EU ETS from a 
societal perspective. When assessing their relative merits, it is important to assess the 
potential environmental, economic or social effects against the principal objectives of the 
ETS, i.e. to reduce CO2 emissions in a cost-effective way. There are a number of 
compensation  measures including government support in the form of tax breaks, other 
reductions of burdens, government subsidies, re-distributed ‘windfall taxes’, but also more 
subtle mechanisms that could work through the ETS. They also raise a number of questions, 
however. 
17. The fundamental assumption upon which compensation or redistribution rests depends on 
whether energy-intensive companies choose to cross-subsidise their production by the 
amount of the compensation they have received – at least in the short-term – or whether 
they base their investment decisions on opportunity costs, meaning that the revenues are 
invested where they promise the highest return, i.e. possibly in other regions than the EU. 
Hence, compensation measures would need to be designed to create incentives for investing 
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18. Another critical element is where the financial resources for compensation come from and 
how they are redistributed. If it is the government that compensates, it is likely that revenues 
will first be collected via a tax on windfall profits, auctioning, or through other measures. 
Compensation raises many equity issues and internal market issues.  
19. An option that has been discussed in this and the previous CEPS Task Force on the business 
consequences of emissions trading is indirect allocation of emissions allowances. In such a 
system of grandfathering, electricity users receive emissions allowances for free while 
power generators are responsible for surrendering allowances according to their actual 
emissions. They would buy their allowances from the energy-intensive sector, for which 
this would constitute compensation. While this would allow for full pass-through of CO2 
costs (the intended objective of the ETS), reduce possible windfall profits and compensate 
energy-intensive industries, it raises issues of fairness for the non-covered sector and 
households remain uncompensated. Including them in such a scheme would, however, 
increase the complexity of the EU ETS significantly. Furthermore, those energy-intensive 
sectors that in fact are able to pass through the cost increases due to higher power prices 
would be compensated twice, reaping in fact windfall profits.  
 
Aviation  
20. The question of whether aviation is suitable in principle to be included in the EU ETS 
hinges on the answers to three questions. The first concerns the impact on the allowance 
price. The second is whether a number of still-open questions related to the full impact of 
aviation, measuring and monitoring, and allocation can be solved. The third is whether the 
intended controlling of greenhouse emissions from the aviation sector would in fact be 
achieved. 
21. The first challenge is how to treat the full impact of aviation on climate that goes beyond the 
effects of CO2 emissions. Second, if the EU ETS is extended to non-CO2 gases, there would 
need to be some common metric, which to date is not easily available.
6 Third, there are a 
number of open issues associated with allocation under current ETS rules. As the aviation 
sector as a whole, as well as aircraft and airport operators, are highly sensitive to economic 
circumstances in individual countries and regions, and to isolated local and regional events, 
the choice of a particular base year could have major distributional effects. In addition, the 
definition of new entrants could create a serious barrier to the application of grandfathering 
to aviation, since the definition in aviation is more complex than for stationary sources. 
Further problems include reliability and availability of aircraft-specific emissions data. 
22. Given these open questions, including air transport in the ETS from 2008 onwards will be a 
considerable challenge. However, if the sector were included in the ETS at a later stage, free 
allocation could create perverse incentives for airlines to increase activity and/or delay fleet 
renewal in the reference period before joining the EU ETS, to get as many allowances as 
possible. A technology benchmark could tackle the second incentive, while responsibility 
for addressing the first incentive rests with governments by setting the cap for the sector. 
The effect would also limit the timing for bringing aviation into the ETS. Bringing aviation 
into the ETS during the second allocation period would have important consequences for 
NAPs phase II and for how the uncertainties of potential aviation emissions are treated. 
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23. According to a European Commission-sponsored study, the economic impact on the 
aviation sector appears to be minimal for a number of reasons related to the sector’s 
business model, the high degree of regulation and the generally limited impact of the ETS 
on airline costs. The latter, however, rests on the debatable assumption that the opportunity 
costs of allowances issued free of charge are not passed on to passengers. There will also be 
distributional impacts among different airlines. Low-cost airlines would experience greater 
impacts, as the cost increases would be proportionally higher than for higher-cost airlines. 
The latter could eventually offset some of the higher costs in the higher-price business class 
segment where price elasticity is lower.  
24. It is estimated that marginal abatement costs in air transport are far higher than in sectors 
already included in the ETS, which almost certainly would make aviation a net buyer of 
allowances. Therefore, allowance prices would rise. It is assumed that air transport would 
buy around 1-2% of the total quantity of EU allowances. This would equal the amount of 
allowances by which the market is currently expected to be short. The price effect could be 
considerable. This demand will even be considerably higher in case radiative forcing
7 is 
taken into account. Finally, this also assumes that the trading market is efficient, notably 
that it is both liquid and free of distortions, which is not necessarily the case in a newly 
created market.  
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Introduction 
This report constitutes Part II of the twin reports of the CEPS Task Force on Reviewing the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. The Part I report, which was presented to the UK Presidency on 7 
July 2005,
1 focused on a number of short-term implementation issues including transparency 
requirements for the National Allocation Plans (NAPs), the definition of installations, treatment 
of small installations, new entrants, closure and transfer rules, allocation methodologies, the 
possibility of opt-ins as well as monitoring, reporting and verification. This follow-up Part II 
report examines deep-seated topics such as whether the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) 
contributes to meeting Kyoto Protocol targets, economic impacts, effects on investment and the 
potential inclusion of aviation. These issues lie at the interface of NAP phase II and the long-
term formal 2006 review. Neither of the two reports (Part I or Part II) examines issues related to 
the formal review of the EU ETS, which the Directive calls for no later than June 2006. Since 
this formal review, which will lead to an amendment of the Directive by co-decision, is likely to 
trigger a fundamental and longer-term debate, it is being treated in a separate CEPS Task Force 
launched in early 2006. 
After a status report of the ETS and a reminder of some fundamentals in sections 1 and 2, the 
following sections cover investment incentives (3), competitiveness (4 and 5) and aviation (6). 
The main findings of the report are contained in the Executive Summary, including Key 
Messages & Recommendations and an extended Full Summary.  
Appendix 1 presents a list of members of the Task Force and invited guests and speakers.  
1.  Status of the EU ETS 
Even though the ETS will ultimately be judged on the basis of its effectiveness as a tool to 
reduce GHG emissions, the underlying rationale for choosing emissions trading was based on 
economic considerations. From the outset, those designing the ETS have attempted to 
internalise a market externality (i.e. CO2 emissions) with minimal impact on competitiveness. 
Under the ETS, the market price of carbon is equal to the lowest marginal abatement cost 
amongst all controlled sources, thereby ensuring that the environmental objective is achieved at 
the least cost. The resulting market price was expected to create long-term predictability, which 
is critical for spurring investment. In addition, the ETS should offer flexibility to management 
to choose the most cost-effective compliance strategy. And finally, the EU ETS has attempted 
to add extra flexibility and potentially low-cost abatement options by allowing credits from the 
Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms to be used for compliance via the Linking Directive. The 
Linking Directive could also be a tool to smooth the differences across member states as a result 
of the 1998 Burden-Sharing Agreement (BSA).  
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It is too early to pass final judgement until at least the first compliance period comes to a close 
at the end of March. Although the ETS has been adopted in a very short period of time – 
reflecting the strong political will in the EU to meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol – 
implementation is far from complete. In many respects, the EU ETS is still a construction site 
with many critical elements of the infrastructure still under creation. For example, only around 
two-thirds of the 25 registries are in place. Moreover, in some member states, the installation 
level allocations have not yet been decided, the International Transaction Log will not be 
functional for some time and only the most hesitant steps are being taken towards implementing 
the Linking Directive.
2  A lack of infrastructure inhibits trading activity and efficient price-
setting.  
While this infrastructure is progressively being put into place, the initial phase of the EU ETS 
has coincided with high energy prices, which in the context of non-functioning energy markets 
generally has increased costs to enterprises. Beyond that, another important factor for the initial 
results of the EU ETS has been the increased spread between coal and gas prices, which has 
pushed up EU allowance prices. In the short term, fuel switching – from coal to gas – is the 
principle way to reduce CO2 emissions. However, the coal/gas spread increase has compelled 
power plants to burn more coal, which in return has made CO2 prices climb. In addition to 
shortcomings due to the lack of infrastructure, this has generally meant that it was mainly the 
power sector, which is short due to allocation and the coal/gas spread, that has engaged in the 
trading market. The industrial sector – generally long – has been less engaged. In addition, most 
active trading participants come from those member states with tighter allocation, and hence are 
buyers. On the other hand, market participants from those countries with less tight allocation, 
potential sellers from mainly but not only the new member states, have not yet engaged in 
trading as a result of a lack of infrastructure and in some cases, the absence of installation level 
allocation.  
Against this background of an incomplete trading infrastructure and high energy prices, a 
number of general comments on the ETS can nevertheless be made. While in some respects the 
EU ETS has been close to an economist’s ideal structure for internalising environmental costs, 
in other respects it differs significantly. A number of observations can be made for the initial 
evaluation of the scheme. For example, short-term allocation periods, grandfathering combined 
with changing the baseline year (i.e. updating)
3 and the lack of consistency between member 
states with regard to allocation methodologies could undermine efficiency and cause distortions 
between different participants (see Kruger & Pizer, 2004; Neuhoff et al., 2005; Sijm et al., 
2005; Keats & Neuhoff, 2005). Historical grandfathering, if based on updating, induces gaming 
and undermines incentives to reduce emissions. Similarly, limited new entrants’ reserves may 
hinder new investment, namely at the moment that reserves are used up. Many of these issues 
have been discussed in the Part I report.  
Some criticism was raised regarding the absence of a long-term target and the fact that targets 
are not in line with the investment cycle. Combined with allocation in the ETS, the absence of a 
long-term target has heightened fears that the EU ETS inhibits rather than fosters investment 
(IEA, 2003; IEA, 2005a). The EU ETS does not operate in a political vacuum and is affected by 
international developments, which are beyond the control of the EU.  
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The fact that major competitors, in for example the US or fast-growing developing countries, 
are not subject to a similar carbon constraint has generated concerns about the competitiveness 
of European energy-intensive industries. Such concerns were originally less prominent as it was 
thought that the combination of the economic efficiency of the ETS and ‘moderate’ carbon 
prices, due in part to the possibilities emerging from the Linking Directive, would keep the 
additional burden ‘manageable’. However, recent developments suggest that this may not 
naturally be the case. Although the impact on competitiveness is subject to controversy since 
competitiveness depends on many factors far beyond environmental costs (see the previous 
CEPS Task Force on the Business Consequences of the EU ETS, Egenhofer, Fujiwara & 
Gialoglou, 2005), studies (see Carbon Trust, 2004; IEA, 2005a; IEA 2005b) concur that 
industries are directly affected in their net value as a result of the fact that the sector cannot pass 
through price increases, as product prices are set by international commodity markets. This is 
particularly the case for primary aluminium and for cement in certain locations. The same may 
become true for other sectors, such as for example BOF (basic oxygen furnace) steel, should the 
global boom come to a halt. The principal reason for such potential consequences is the so-
called ‘indirect effects’ of the EU ETS through power price increases (see e.g. Mannaerts & 
Muldur, 2003; Sijm, 2004).  
Somehow less conspicuous have been the potential effects on EU power markets. Under certain 
conditions, the EU ETS can potentially increase market power concentration, which according 
to the European Commission and national regulatory authorities, in some member states has 
become a major obstacle to competition (European Commission, 2005a). At the centre of 
attention have particularly been the windfall profits that the ETS is likely to generate. It has 
even been argued that windfall profits in effect remunerate the polluter and is therefore contrary 
to the ‘polluter-pays’ principle.  
A major challenge of the ETS is the wide sector coverage, including notably process emissions 
from different industrial sectors as well as those from power generation. While this raises many 
issues on monitoring and reporting, there may be different economic impacts on sectors. While 
some of the ETS concerns affect all sectors in similar ways (e.g. investment incentives), in other 
respects there are very different effects at play. For example, for power companies, a main 
concern may be the impact on the power market structure, while for energy-intensive industries 
concerns about competitiveness in global markets may take precedence. The power sector 
generally can pass through cost increases. Energy-intensive industries do not always have this 
option. Although as the preliminary results from the European Commission, McKinsey & 
Ecofys (2005) ETS survey show, some companies expect to be able to pass through CO2 costs. 
A more recent related concern is about differentials in abatement costs in the covered sectors. 
While the concept of emissions trading is built on the existence of abatement costs differentials, 
big differentials can lead to distributional impacts. This fear has recently been highlighted as a 
result of the discussions over the possible inclusion of air transport into the scheme.  
While major changes to the EU ETS will require a revision of the Directive, which implies a 
process stretching over several years from now, the following sections discuss possible 
improvements to deal with perceived issues of the ETS in the near term. These include 
environmental effectiveness, investment incentives, competitiveness and aviation.  
2.  Measuring the ETS against environmental objectives  
The overall objective of EU climate change policy is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
general and to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets in particular. Since the EU ETS is the most 
important single instrument with which the EU and its member states intend to achieve these 
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under the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) that determine the environmental benefit of the 
ETS.  
After the completion and the European Commission approval of all first-round NAPs, there is 
concern that some national caps, in combination with other policy measures might not be able to 
ensure emissions reductions in line with EU and member states’ climate targets (see e.g. Grubb 
et al., 2005). According to CAN Europe (Duwe, 2005), in the first learning phase from 2005-07, 
only two of the EU-15 member states that are part of the Burden-Sharing Agreement (BSA) 
have imposed reductions on the covered sectors from historic levels. All other member states 
allow for increases, despite the fact that most are off-track towards fulfilling their obligations 
under the BSA. If the EU ETS is to achieve its objectives to demonstrate to other countries that 
greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced without damaging the economy, it will also need to 
show to achieve reductions in line with EU member states’ Kyoto Protocol targets. In order to 
do so, the second round of National Allocation Plans should provide more clarity on the 
trajectories of current and planned overall greenhouse emissions in each member state. This 
should include information and data on all – both covered and non-covered – sectors as well as 
the use of credits from the Kyoto mechanisms. This should be guided by a philosophy that 
abatement costs for the individual sectors are more or less the same in order to ensure that the 
planned trajectories will lead to cost-efficient reductions.  
During the second round of National Allocation Plans (NAPs), it will be of critical importance 
for member states to develop strategies to ensure that compliance costs for all sectors are more 
or less the same. Otherwise, overall compliance costs for meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets 
will increase, as lower than expected contributions in one sector will need to be made in other 
sectors. This is most likely to miss low-cost abatement opportunities, as for example has been 
shown in the European Climate Change Programme. As for the EU ETS, underperformance of 
the non-covered sector will increase uncertainty for the ETS sector, notably for national caps 
and allocation. Alternatively, a lack of reduction at member state level could be compensated 
for by credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, as many member states have 
suggested. However, since the availability of such credits is highly uncertain, member states 
may have to resort to the purchase of AAUs (Assigned Amount Units).
4. Both, however, find 
their limit in the ‘supplementarity’ provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and the Linking Directive. 
‘Unrealistic’ member state strategies will increase risks and uncertainty in the covered sector. 
3.  Creating investment incentives  
In the long-term, a critical element to meet the climate change challenge will be investment in 
new and carbon-friendly technologies. Such investment can be facilitated by a high degree of 
certainty, but this quality is reduced by a number of factors, many of which the EU cannot 
control. This is the case for example both for the nature of commitments and the structure of a 
future global agreement but also for the impact of the Linking Directive in the period to 2012.  
In addition to these exogenous factors, the EU ETS itself may add to further investment 
uncertainty in the covered sector and as a result, new investment may be deferred. The reason 
for this is mainly short-term allocation, which provides certainty only for a three- or possibly 
five-year period, which is far shorter than those associated with investment cycles. The situation 
is aggravated by the fact that ambiguity of allocation rules and their lack of harmonisation or 
consistency across member states increase the pressure on member states to treat their industry 
no worse than other member states (see Part I report). Hence, there might be a risk of a ‘race to 
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the bottom’, only ultimately controlled by the European Commission and EC law. Such a race 
to the bottom would not only be detrimental to investment but would also increase overall 
compliance costs as has been discussed in the previous section. 
As a result, discussions have focussed on how to create greater stability and predictability for 
the covered sectors of the EU ETS. Given that about half of the EU’s power plant park is 
nearing the end of their lives and, combined with the growth in power consumption, the 
European Commission expects that up to 600 GWe of the installed capacity needed in 2020 has 
yet to be built. While this constitutes a major opportunity from a climate change perspective – 
as the EU could embark on low-carbon power generation – it also carries risks. Investment 
uncertainty is detrimental to a stable and secure power supply. Hence, investment uncertainty is 
not only a concern for climate change policy but also for energy policy and security of supply.  
The situation for the manufacturing sector is not much different. Uncertainty will lead firms to 
defer investment. As a consequence, existing installations will run longer and hence the 
emissions will be higher than they otherwise would be.  
In a short-term perspective, the allocation process, i.e. the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) is 
of critical importance. We therefore also analyse allocation methodologies in this Part II report 
while making reference to the Part I report, where appropriate. There have been a number of 
additional ideas such as establishing longer-term allocation periods or aligning targets with the 
investment cycle by using for example long-term efficiency targets as an instrument to set a cap 
for the manufacturing industry or different or changing allocation rules. Since some of these 
suggestions would necessitate changes in the Directive, not all of them will be considered in the 
report, which concentrates on improving the second round of NAPs.  
3.1  New entrants and closure rules 
Our Part I report singled out new entrants and closure rules as one of the most important areas 
for allocation and documented the complexities involved (section 3.4). The report listed five 
reasons in support of free allocation to new entrants, despite the fact that theory argues in favour 
of making them buy allowances. These reasons are: fairness, possible capital constraints, 
overcompensation of existing firms through grandfathering, existing closure rules and limiting 
wholesale power price rises and windfall profits. Hence, treating new entrants the same way as 
existing companies may actually help the deployment of new and more efficient technology. 
The other side of the coin is that the rules governing new entrants and especially the setting up 
of new entrants’ reserves have increased complexity, thereby adding costs, reducing efficiency, 
and as a result, possibly blurring the economic incentives for investment. In addition, there is a 
risk that new investment will be stopped in case the new entrant’s reserve is depleted.  
Furthermore, new entrants rules must be seen in connection with closure rules. Theory suggests 
that allowances should not be removed in case of closure in order to increase the incentives to 
close down inefficient installations earlier than would otherwise be the case. Closing down 
inefficient installations would make space for new and more efficient investment. On the other 
hand, since allowances are given for free, they constitute a transfer from the government to 
firms. With closure, the justification for this transfer disappears. Since allocation periods, 
however, are short, in reality this impact does not extend beyond the three- to five-year 
allocation periods. Member states have introduced transfer rules or attempted to provide longer-
term certainty to notably the power sector. To take one example, the German NAP guarantees 
100% of allowances for free for new power plants for 14 years if based on BAT (best available 
techniques), although such long-term allocation may not be covered by the Directive.  
Providing additional certainty to both the power and manufacturing sector runs counter to the 
provision in the Directive for multiple short allocation periods, unless it is based on carbon-18 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
efficiency, e.g. benchmarks. Hence total certainty cannot be extended beyond these periods. 
This sets limits on what member states can do within the current framework of allocation. 
3.2 Benchmarks 
Another measure that has been proposed for addressing investment was benchmarks, which, as 
explained in Part I of this report, offer a number of additional advantages. They can increase 
fairness, facilitate new entrants and closure rules, reward CO2-efficiency and early action, and 
as a result, could increase the acceptability of the EU ETS. For a full discussion, see section 3.5 
of the Part I report and Radov et al. (2005). On the other hand, benchmarking requires 
processing significant volumes of data, which are not always readily available. This is notably 
the case for complex production processes with different legal operators. 
Benchmarks have been used in phase I of the NAPs in a number of countries for allocating to 
new entrants or a number of specific installations. While the Directive explicitly covers the use 
of benchmarks, one practical problem has been that the metrics used by the member states have 
differed, ranging from installed capacity, projected utilisation rates, projected output or BAT 
(see Part I report).  
While there seems to be strong interest and support among member states to further analyse and 
develop benchmarks (see Part I report), there are two preconditions to allow benchmarks to be 
applied in the NAPs phase II in a systematic way to address the investment issue. First, member 
states would need to agree both on which benchmarks to use (e.g. fuel, technology or product-
specific) and which metrics to apply (e.g. installed capacity, projected utilitisation rates, 
projected output or BAT). Second, the availability of data will need to be ensured. Most likely, 
this implies that the industry sectors covered by the ETS broadly would need to agree to such an 
approach, although legally speaking, industry consent would not be needed.  
Nevertheless, member states will continue to use and even to extend the application of 
benchmarking in the allocation process, and the lessons are likely to inform allocation processes 
in the future. However, as the next allocation period will only extend to 5 years, the application 
of benchmarks will not be able to provide major certainty beyond 2012.  
3.3  Long-term efficiency targets for the manufacturing sector 
During the first round of allocation, when establishing the overall cap under the NAP, member 
states have been sensitive to industry’s concerns not to limit production through a cap that is too 
tough to meet. This stance is consistent with member states’ responsibility to maintain good 
conditions for economic development, including job creation. And indeed, NAPs in many 
respects have shown features of negotiations between the governments and industry in member 
states showing the political limitations member states encounter when trying to impose 
consistent targets in line with the Kyoto Protocol commitments. This is especially true for 
manufacturing or energy-intensive industries, which are in many cases is subject to global 
competition. The situation for the power sector is different as it generally can pass on the CO2 
costs. The first round of national allocation has exposed the fact that there is an implicit upper 
limit of the ‘willingness to pay’ in the industry and government in member states. This situation 
is likely to continue throughout the second round of allocation, and member states can be 
expected to continue to avoid imposing constraints on economic growth on their industry. As a 
result, emissions would grow.  
Short-term allocation combined with somewhat lenient targets, however, firstly do not lead to 
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investment. It has therefore been proposed
5 that the allocation to the energy-intensive sector be 
based on long-term efficiency (or relative) targets based on Performance Standard Rates (PSRs) 
as has been used for voluntary or negotiated agreements or covenants. According to Schyns 
(2005), in the Netherlands alone about 100 so-called world-top PSRs were established for 
different processes for a variety of industry sectors.  
The advantage of such an approach is that it could provide long-term certainty for the sector and 
hence provide investment certainty. However, certainty cannot extend beyond the allocation 
period. In addition, there is a danger of regulatory capture. For instance, if targets were set too 
lenient and did not go beyond business as usual, the unambitious targets would be frozen for a 
considerable time, to the detriment of the environment and investment. Another issue is how 
such a system could be incorporated into the EU ETS, which operates on absolute caps. Setting 
relative targets would transform the ETS into a baseline and credit scheme, which is not 
foreseen under the Directive. Hence, this would require a change of the Directive, and therefore 
makes it a topic for the 2006 formal review. Nothing, however, will stop member states from 
basing their allocation to the energy-intensive sector on benchmarks. Such an approach would 
still fall short of relative targets but nevertheless has the potential to increase certainty in the 
manufacturing industry as it would provide broad guidance to allocation and therefore, to the 
industry. The issue of relative targets should however be revisited in the formal 2006 review. 
3.4 Auctioning 
Using auctioning has also been proposed as a possible means of creating investment incentives 
as it would create a more reliable forward curve, and hence clearer price signals. On the other 
hand, auctioning will be likely to create the impact on costs and resulting effects on 
competitiveness (i.e. profits, market share) for the energy-intensive industries, whose 
competitors are not subject to a similar carbon constraint. There will be a ‘secondary allocation’ 
debate on how to recycle revenues. Moreover, there will be open questions on the mechanics of 
auctioning because those member states that want to use it are likely to inhibit the broad use of 
auctioning. While the Directive says that for the second period, 90% of the allowances must be 
allocated for free, it is not clear whether member states could not auction more than 10% as long 
as they recycle the revenues to the covered sector. Some have argued that the Directive would 
allow for a higher level of auctioning as long as it was accompanied by full recycling. But as 
this remains controversial, the issue would almost certainly have to be settled by the European 
Court of Justice. In the event that 100% of allocations were to be auctioned, power prices would 
increase due to the fact that the costs of CO2 allowances would become part of the investment 
calculations based on full costs for new plants. In the medium and longer term, however, this 
would lead to a shift to less carbon-intensive fuels, most likely gas. Such a shift to gas could 
further increase import dependency on mainly Russian gas, potentially increasing risks 
associated with security of supply. Effects of higher power prices of course could be offset by 
the revenue recycling, depending on the exact rules for recycling. 
3.5  The Ten-Year Rule  
The ‘Ten-Year Rule’ (Ahmann et al., 2005) is an approach for balancing efficiency 
considerations including investment with perceived issues of fairness. The concept 
acknowledges both the need to compensate incumbent installations for sunk costs and not to 
discriminate against new entrants for reasons of fairness. At the same time, the notion addresses 
possible perverse incentives to continue operation under the current rules. As was outlined in 
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the Part I report, the right to keep allowances that are received for free increases the incentive to 
continue running a less efficient existing plant.  
Under the Ten-Year Rule, a member state will allocate allowances based on an average of say 
three reference years (e.g. 2000-02) for 10 years. This creates certainty. After 10 years, the 
reference years would be updated on a rolling basis, i.e. from 2000-02 to 2001-03, etc. Hence, 
there is some compensation for sunk costs but not forever. A company cannot count on keeping 
the property rights forever. A new entrant would receive allowances from a reserve according to 
emission rate benchmarks (to be standardised across the EU member states). The new entrant 
would receive its allocation on this basis for 10 years, after which time it would switch to 
update on the rolling base period as the incumbent. If existing installations are shut down, they 
would receive allowances for 10 years, thereby diminishing any perverse incentives to continue 
operation. Allocation of allowances would slowly shift towards different installations as sources 
that shut down cease receiving allowances. The Ten-Year Rule can be applied for different 
allocation methodologies, including grandfathering, benchmarking and auctioning. An open 
question is what happens if production processes change. A pressing problem is also limited 
new entrants’ reserves. Over a period of 10 years, the management of new entrants’ reserves 
becomes more difficult if not impossible.  
The perceived advantage of the Ten-Year Rule is that it addresses the political dilemma of how 
to treat all participants in a trading scheme in a fair way while maintaining as much of the 
economic efficiency that the EU ETS can have. It strives to achieve a compromise between not 
giving an indefinite allocation of allowances but maintaining the incentives to close down, 
which is a prerequisite for new investment.  
3.6  Long-term indicative targets for the power sector 
The issue of investment incentives is particularly important for the power sector. It is generally 
assumed that a large cut-back will have to be achieved in the electricity sector. Moreover, 
expected growth in consumption and the fact that about one-half of the existing power plant 
park will need to be replaced offer the EU power sector a particular opportunity to move 
towards less carbon-intensive power production. Such changes however require a very long 
time as the investment cycle in the power sector runs for 40 years or more.  
Price changes induced by the ETS, as well as uncertainty related to allocation and the absence 
of a long-term international climate change agreement are generally not expected to lead to 
major changes in power generation technologies, with the exception of natural gas. Against this 
background, there has been an interest in providing a longer-term signal to the power sector. 
One idea mentioned has been to develop long-term indicative targets for the EU as a whole or if 
more appropriate, for the relevant national or regional markets. In order for such an indicative 
target to serve its purpose, it would need to extend far beyond the short-term allocation periods. 
This would however mean that member states would be forced to develop an energy strategy on 
how to arrive at necessary reductions as has for example been attempted in the UK Energy 
White Paper. A precondition for setting realistic targets would therefore be an agreed energy 
policy dealing with fuel mix, security of supply as well as other parameters. While such a policy 
initially could still be formulated at member state level, progressively the integration of energy 
markets as well as climate change policies will necessitate the formulation of an EU-wide 
policy. Unfortunately, any attempts to this end have been frustrated by member states’ 
reluctance to allow for any meaningful energy policy competencies at EU level.  
Another issue is the legal nature of such indicative targets. Non-binding targets have very often 
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6 or the more recent ‘soft’ targets set in the Lisbon agenda. In order to be effective, targets 
could be attached to a revised EU ETS, similar to what has been the case in the Renewables 
Directive, whose Annex contains formulated targets. While the status of these targets is still 
uncertain – and may ultimately be decided by the European Courts – the European Commission 
maintains that they constitute a commitment by member states, at least to move towards 
achieving them. Prior to the review of the ETS Directive, targets will most likely remain by and 
large unilateral commitments by member states without any legal binding character. 
4.  Economic and distributional impacts 
There is a general consensus that environmental objectives, including those related to climate 
change, should be achieved in the most cost-effective way possible. Reaching such objectives 
will not be without costs, however. Irrespective of which instrument is chosen, there will be 
additional costs falling on the industry. This is potentially causing problems in a situation where 
European companies face competition from non-EU firms that are not subject to a similar 
constraint. Another matter, however, is how this burden is distributed among the sectors.  
4.1  How the ETS affects different sectors  
The EU ETS does not affect all installations and sectors the same way. Broadly speaking, there 
are four trends at work. First, as a result of the burden-sharing agreement and member states’ 
progress towards the Kyoto Protocol and the fact that allocation is undertaken at member state 
level, there are differences in the way in which member states allocate to their industries. 
Second, some industries are able to pass through full costs. Others are not. Third, the power 
sector is affected once, i.e. by the increase of production costs, while energy-intensive industries 
can be affected twice: in addition to the increased costs for process emissions – in case these 
emissions are not covered by free allocation – by higher power prices. Fourth, in some cases, 
power generators can even earn windfall profits to the detriment of energy-intensive industries.  
As a result, the potential economic impact of the ETS can either stem from the need to cover 
process emissions – not covered by free allocation – or power price increases. The actual impact 
on each sector or installation then depends on: i) a sector’s ability to pass through costs in 
different product markets, ii) geography (i.e. the proximity of competitors) and iii) the structure 
of national or regional power markets from which the industries buy their power. In an 
increasingly globalised economy, however, analysis shows that moderate increases in 
production costs will have long-term implications for the localisation patterns of all affected 
industries over the medium term by freezing new capacity. 
4.2  Power price increases  
The most controversial issue has been the ETS’ impact on power prices. As a market-based 
instrument, the EU ETS was designed to change the relative prices to reflect the price of carbon 
and thereby provide incentives to reduce CO2  emissions. Since power prices for annual 
standardised contracts have, according to for example Argus, increased throughout continental 
Europe at an average of 50% or more in 2005, some energy-intensive companies note that a 
significant part of that inflation can be attributed to EU allowance price developments. In fact, 
power prices are influenced by many factors, of which the EU ETS is but one. In general it is 
difficult to assess the impact of CO2 allowance prices as these are determined by a large variety 
                                                 
6 For example, the 1985-95 EU energy objectives foresaw a 20% increase in energy efficiency, whereas a 
mere 5.7% was finally achieved. Intergovernmental coordination in the field of energy policies has not 
worked. 22 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
of factors, including fuel prices, available generation capacity, euro/US dollar exchange rates, 
investment costs, power imports, weather conditions, heat demand (‘must runs’), the flexibility 
of gas contracts and well as market expectations and more. Even the extent to which CO2 prices 
are passed through to power prices varies by market, load factor and the power market in 
question (see e.g. Christiansen et al., 2005; Sijm, 2004; Sijm et al., 2005).  
The EU ETS was launched at a time of very high energy prices, in the context of non-
functioning energy markets. Naturally this had an upward effect on power prices. A second and 
possibly more important factor for the EU allowance market has been the increased spread 
between coal and gas prices. In the short term, fuel switching – from coal to gas – is the 
principal way to reduce CO2 emissions. However, the coal/gas spread increase has made power 
plants to continue to burn more coal, increasing demand for EU allowances. Hence, CO2 prices 
have climbed. Third, the situation has been aggravated by the absence of trading infrastructure 
such as registries, the International Transactions Log and in some cases, even completion of 
installation-level allocation. While the lack of infrastructure generally inhibits trading activity 
and efficient price-setting, its impact has been even greater. Due to these shortcomings, it was 
mainly the power sector, which is short due to allocation and the coal/gas price spread, that has 
engaged in the trading market. The industrial sector – generally long – has engaged to a lesser 
extent. In addition, most active trading participants come from those member states with tighter 
allocation, and hence are buyers. On the other hand, market participants from those countries 
with less tight allocation, i.e. potential sellers from mainly but not only the new member states, 
have not yet fully engaged in trading as a result of a lack of infrastructure and in some cases, the 
absence of installation level allocation. Fourth, current allocation rules provide disincentives to 
close inefficient plants, and allow for potential windfall profits for the power sector, which are 
possible because a lack of competition and because of distortions in EU power markets. A fifth 
reason might be that transposition of the Linking Directive has been slow and in some cases 
restrictive. Sixth, organisational issues with the CDM Executive Board that have hampered 
supply of CDM credits have been addressed at the Conference of Parties (COP 11) in Montreal 
in November/December 2005. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the EU ETS’ objective to 
include the CO2 price into the marginal costs of power, although very likely pushes up power 
prices, may at the same time reduce coal prices. Coal prices may actually decrease as a result in 
order to stay competitive in EU power markets with the EU ETS. This depends however on the 
influence of EU demand on the global coal market. 
4.3  Impact on industrial sectors  
Several studies such as IEA (2005) and Carbon Trust (2004), have concluded that at a price of 
around €10 per tonne of CO2 and taking into account both direct (i.e. the need to cover process 
emissions) and indirect effects (i.e. impacts due to power price increases) the competitiveness of 
European industry, with the exception of aluminium, would be muted. This conclusion was 
based on the assumption that there would be a full or almost full pass-through of the allowance 
price, irrespective of whether they are provided for free or not (Carbon Trust, 2004; IEA, 2005, 
summarised in Egenhofer, Fujiwara & Gialoglou, 2005). According to the IEA (2005a) full 
pass-through of the carbon opportunity cost in power prices would on average lead to an 11% 
increase in the price of the continental European power at a price of €10 per tonne of CO2. Since 
the actual price of CO2 is double that sum, the impact will be significantly higher. In the 
meantime, Sijm (2005) provides evidence for north-western Europe, using a variety of 
analytical approaches, including interviews with stakeholders, empirical and statistical analyses, 
theoretical explorations and economic models, that pass-through is around 50% to 80%. Similar 
figures have been given in personal conversations with the rapporteurs. According to highlights 
of the European Commission, McKinsey and Ecofys (2005) survey of the EU ETS, some 
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As a matter of fact, the actual impact on competitiveness will largely depend on the ability of 
sectors to pass through costs in different product markets.
7 Different sectors’ ‘ability to pass 
through costs’ depends among others on how quickly non-EU producers can increase their 
production in the short-term. It is, therefore likely, that negative effects on competitiveness do 
not fully come into play in the short-term with the notable exception of the aluminium, cement 
and possibly steel industries, especially should the ‘China boom’ falter (see also Quirion & 
Hourcade, 2003). Impacts depend also on geography. Some energy-intensive industries may 
suffer a competitive disadvantage owing to the fact that competitors of the EU industry may not 
be subject to the same constraints. For some industries the competitive disadvantage is related to 
the geographical proximity of their competitors’ particular installations (e.g. refining or cement 
production in the Mediterranean countries). For a more detailed analysis see IEA (2005b).  
Studies (Carbon Trust, 2004; IEA, 2005) conclude that it is aluminium sector – which is not 
included in the EU ETS – that very likely will experience the biggest economic impact. 
According to the aluminium industry, the power price constitutes more than 25% of the total 
production costs of primary aluminium. As primary aluminium is a globally traded commodity, 
its price is set by the world market and the European aluminium industry has no opportunity to 
pass on the increased costs. Preliminary conclusions from a study that Mc Kinsey is undertaking 
for the European Commission to study the impact indicate that a price of €25/t CO2 will lead to 
a 14% cost increase for primary aluminium production. An internal analysis by Hydro (Nord, 
2005) shows an even greater increase. The aluminium industry reckons that this would represent 
an average 10% of the selling price of metal at today’s prices (Stevens, 2005).  
Under a €10 per tonne of CO2 scenario by the IEA (2005b) study, basic oxygen furnace steel, 
cement and aluminium would incur high reductions in margins of between 6-8%. At current 
CO2 prices, the impact is significantly higher. Contrary to the IEA study, the Carbon Trust 
(2004) concluded that at a price of €10 per tonne of CO2, only aluminium would be directly 
affected in its net value. At a price of €25 per tonne of CO2, however, Carbon Trust (2004) 
estimated that aluminium, cement and steel would need to be able to pass on significant price 
increases in order to maintain their market share. The figures are 31.4% for aluminium, 7.3% 
for steel and 17.4% for cement. Although there is major controversy on the ability of pass-
through of sectors, it is hard to imagine that industries are able to pass-through cost increases in 
that magnitude.  
Neither of the studies has examined the specific effects that occur due to geographical proximity 
of non-EU competitors for example in the Mediterranean in cement or refining. Some energy-
intensive industries may suffer a competitive disadvantage owing to the fact that competitors of 
the EU industry may not be subject to the same constraints. For some industries the competitive 
disadvantage is related to the geographical proximity of their competitors’ particular 
installations (e.g. refining or cement production in the Mediterranean countries).  
According to Lafarge (Nollet, 2005) for the European cement sector costs due to the ETS are 
about the same as total fixed costs of cement production at a CO2 price of €20 and €25 per 
tonne. Traditionally, the European (as well as the global) cement industry is submitted to 
competitive pressures from imports from non-EU countries from for example Asia or elsewhere 
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and which enter the EU via the Mediterranean. Generally speaking these imports are based on 
short-term marginal costs of producers plus costs for transport and loading, maritime transport 
cost, margin for importer and if prices allow, a possible top up fee for producer on top of short-
term marginal costs. This puts the markets close to the costs under pressure with a possible 
domino effect on inland markets. In addition, it reduces the competitiveness of Lafarge exports, 
which represent about 10% of total turnover.  
Beyond these identified sectors – i.e. aluminium (as some long-term contracts might not be 
renewed upon their expiration), cement, steel and possible not yet identified product markets – 
it is uncertain whether CO2 prices in Europe up to 2012 will strongly modify the product 
competitiveness of the European industry in general.
 8 However, in an increasingly globalised 
economy, economic analysis shows that moderate increases in production costs may affect far 
more significantly the profit margins and the stock values. This may have long term implication 
for the localisation patterns of these industries by freezing any new capacity in a significant set 
of industrial sectors in Europe.  
5.  Possible options to address competitiveness concerns 
Since the competitiveness effect of the EU ETS is critical for future development, numerous 
proposals have been proposed to address the competitiveness concerns. They have been 
reviewed in NERA (2002) – partly – IEA (2003; 2005b), Sijm et al. (2005), Harrison & Radov 
(2005) as well as during a previous CEPS Task Force (Egenhofer, Fujiwara & Gialoglou, 2005). 
The general conclusion has been that there was no “perfect” solution to address the power price 
issue or at least that many of the options that have been put forward need careful analysis. 
Measures can aim at reducing either the CO2 or the power price. For an authoritative, yet still 
short overview, see Sijm et al. (2005; chapter 8, pp. 82-97).  
They can be grouped into two broad categories: alleviation and compensation measures. But 
logically, before such measures should be considered, a first step is to address existing 
implementation issues such as the missing trading infrastructure (e.g. registries, International 
Transaction Log, installation level of allocation, where missing), the transposition of the 
Linking Directive, allocation-related inefficiencies, efficiency of the CDM Executive Board but 
also the working of EU power markets. These measures – completing the trading infrastructure 
being the most important one – can be expected to ease EU allowances prices in the EU.  
5.1  Alleviation measures  
Alleviation measures ease impacts of the ETS on the affected sectors by changing the incentive 
structure of the ETS and hence company decisions. There is a risk of distortions in the EU 
power or other markets, able to undermining market functioning. Hence, alleviation measures 
need to be carefully analysed as to this effect.  
In the follow we will consider auctioning, regulatory measures, measures to limit CO2 prices 
and allocation based on benchmarks.  
Auctioning 
In theory auctioning is preferable to other allocation methodologies such as free allocation or 
benchmarking. Theoretical advantages are related to equal treatment of all participants, higher 
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efficiency, better reflection of the polluter-pays principle and the revenue generation effect.
9 
Such revenues can be recycled to address public policy objectives such as reduction of other 
taxes, to address market distortions or also to compensate for distributional effects of the ETS. 
The main disadvantage is that it raises costs to participating industries. Typically industry views 
auctioning as a tax, albeit set by the market. Hence, it has little acceptability. If applied to the 
EU only, it will negatively affect competitiveness of EU industry. While recycling of revenues 
would mitigate these effects, it raises questions on how to recycle the revenues in the most 
efficient way, i.e. the management of a “secondary allocation”. Particular issues are internal 
market issues and the role of the EU but also impacts on companies’ cash flow. Most important 
however is the temporary limitation of auctioning under the current Directive, i.e. 5% and 10% 
maximum, for the first and second period respectively. While some have argued that the 
Directive would allow for a higher level of auctioning as long as accompanied by full recycling, 
the issue would almost certainly have to be settled by the European Court of Justice. Beyond 
2012, using 100% auctioning would lead to higher power prices at least in the short term as a 
result of full cost pass through. For the medium and longer term, this would lead to a shift to 
less carbon-intensive fuels, most likely gas. Such a shift to gas could further increase import 
dependency on mainly Russian gas. Effects of higher power prices of course could be offset by 
the revenue recycling, depending on the exact rules for recycling.  
Limiting the allowance price 
Power price impact could equally be addressed by limiting the CO2 allowance price. A lower 
EU allowance price translates into a lower power price increase. A number of theoretical 
possibilities exist. One is to relax the overall cap of the covered sector or to encourage the influx 
of CDM and JI credits into the EU ETS as a result of the Linking Directive. A relaxation of the 
overall cap – without subsequent purchases of CDM and JI credits – means that emissions 
reductions will have to be undertaken by other sectors. This will increase overall compliance 
costs for Member States, as low-cost reduction options in the covered sector would be omitted. 
Substituting the shortfall by purchase of CDM/JI credits on the other hand, runs against current 
political, technical and other constraints related to those. While the EU can attempt to address 
them, it will need the co-operation of all international partners in the UNFCCC. Encouraging 
the influx of CDM/JI credits through the Linking Directive faces the same difficulties. 
Similarly, the use of AAUs by Member States, as an alternative might politically be difficult 
unless such AAUs are “greened” through for example earmarking revenues from sale of excess 
AAUs for projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions (typically referred to as Green 
Investment Scheme or GIS). It is also clear that the use of flexible mechanisms finds its limit in 
the Kyoto Protocol’s and the Linking Directive’s supplementary provision.  
Another option discussed to limit the CO2 price is to set a maximum price on an EU allowance. 
However, the current Directive does not enable the setting of a maximum price and hence this 
does not seem to be a viable option for the second period (2008-12). Moreover, setting a 
maximum price risks missing the environmental objective of the covered sector with the 
consequence described above. Another downside is this would reduce liquidity and therefore 
may actually undermine trading activity and so could be seen as “managing a market”.  
Benchmarking  
Another possible measure is a system of free allocation based on relative quota or a 
Performance Standard Rate (PSR) such as energy/carbon efficiency benchmark per unit of 
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output (e.g. Schyns, 2005; Schyns, 2004; Radov, Harrison & Klevnas, 2005). Benchmarks could 
be multiplied by the expected output to determine the allowances ex-ante or alternatively, 
multiplied by the realised output, i.e. with ex-post adjustment. The major advantages are that it 
would virtually avoid windfall profits, rewards carbon efficiency, and is popular with industry 
since it is less restrictive on economic growth. The major shortcomings that are generally 
associated with benchmarks or standard performance rate are lower economic efficiency, less 
environmental certainty and higher information and other transaction costs. While these issues 
might not constitute absolute obstacle, they nevertheless pose challenges for implementation. 
The most important obstacle to a relative quota system is however that it is note covered by the 
present Directive and does not fit in the existing political consensus and hence can not be 
implemented before 2012.  
5.2  Compensation measures  
In addition to alleviation measures, that attempt to diffuse the effects of the ETS, there are a 
number of potential compensation measures. Compensation measures attempt to correct 
undesirable effects from the EU ETS from a societal perspective. They can include for example, 
government support in form of tax breaks, other reductions of burdens, government subsidies, 
re-distributed “windfall taxes” but also more subtle mechanisms that could work through the 
ETS. All of them raise important questions.  
When assessing their relative merits, it is important to assess the potential environmental, 
economic or social effects against the principal objectives of the ETS, i.e. to reduce CO2 
emissions in a cost-effective way. Another common issue is where to find financial resources 
for compensation. If it is the government that compensates, it will be very likely that revenues 
will first be collected for example in form of a windfall tax, auctioning or through other 
measures. Redistribution in itself raises new major issues; compatibility with EC state aid rules 
and the “secondary allocation” debate on how to redistribute revenues. Most important, the 
assumption upon which compensation rests depends on whether energy-intensive companies 
make a strategic choice to cross-subsidise their production by the amount they have received for 
compensation – at least in the short-term – or whether they base their investment decisions on 
opportunity costs, meaning that the revenues are invested where they promise the highest return. 
Hence, the compensation money may be used for investment in other parts of the world than in 
the EU. Therefore there seems to be a preference for compensation schemes that have the re-
distributive mechanism built in the scheme and minimising the government role.  
One of these mechanisms is the concept of auctioning power-related allowances and recycling 
the revenues to mitigate adverse competitiveness effects (Sijm, 2003; Mannerts & Mulder, 
2003). This would to some degree mitigate the effects on energy-intensive companies or more 
generally reduce other charges. Another option that has been in the discussion for some time 
(see NERA, 2002; pp. 62-63) has been the indirect allocation of emissions allowances. The 
basic idea is to allocate all allowances to the industrial sectors for free rather than to power 
plants. In such a system of grandfathering, electricity users receive emissions allowances for 
free while power generators are responsible for surrendering allowances according to their 
actual emissions. Power generators would buy their allowances from the energy-intensive 
sector, for which this would constitute compensation. While this would allow for full pass-
through of CO2 costs – the intended objective of the ETS –, reduce possible windfall profits and 
compensates energy-intensive industries, it raises other equity issues. The non-covered sector 
and households remain un-compensated. Including them in such a scheme would however 
increase the complexity of the EU ETS significantly. Furthermore, those energy-intensive 
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be compensated twice, in fact reaping windfall profits. Economic rents would simply be 
distributed differently. 
6.  Extension to aviation 
Both the European Commission (2005) and the EU Council of Ministers have expressed their 
interests in analysing whether air transport emissions could be included into the EU ETS.  
Air transport constitutes a fast-growing sector. It is particularly low cost airlines that have been 
expanding at a rapid pace. For example the UK Department of Transport (DETR, 2000) 
estimated that in 2000 aviation emissions accounted for about 13% of UK CO2 emissions, which 
could rise to 31% by 2030. A recent completed study commissioned by the European 
Commission (CE, 2005) concluded that while the EU’s total GHG emissions fell by 5.5% from 
1990 to 2003, CO2 emissions alone from the international aviation of the EU-25 increased by 
73% in the same period (CE 2005:1). The strategy of the Association of European Airlines 
(AEA) proposes a four element strategy
10 consisting of i) developing more efficient 
technologies, notably engines, improvement of air traffic management, which could reduce CO2 
production by 12%; iii) best-practice operation of aircraft; iv) and market-based policy options. 
There may particularly be efficiency improvements due to new aircraft such as the Boeing 
dream liner or the Airbus A380. However, despite fuel efficiency improvements of over 75% 
since the beginning of the jet age, continued incremental improvements in efficiency will not be 
sufficient to offset emissions growth in the sector. An approach based on emissions trading may 
provide an efficient and cost-efficient instrument for addressing the externalities associated with 
climate change. Nevertheless, there are a number of technical and political and economic issues 
that are still subject to debate.  
Note that this section covers the issue of including of air transport generically without 
discussing in detail the various options in which to cover air transport, for example, regarding 
geographical cover or trading entities. For further elaboration on these issues, see CE (2005). 
6.1  Technical issues  
First, there is the issue of the non-CO2 effects of air transport. As with other sectors, the full 
impact of aviation on climate goes beyond the effects of CO2 emissions. Aircraft can contribute 
to the formation of GHG ozone through NOx emissions, trigger formation of condensation trails 
or contrails and possibly enhance the ormation of cirrus clouds, although the scientific 
understanding of these effects is not considered sufficiently developed to define what 
mechanisms may be necessary to mitigate them. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC, 1999) estimated that these non-CO2 effects on global warming could be about 2 
to 4 times greater than those of CO2 alone, even excluding the potential impact of cirrus clouds 
enhancement. If the EU ETS were extended to non-CO2 gases, there would be a need for some 
common metric,
11 which is not easily available to date. If not, there would be a need to develop 
mechanisms to deal with the non-CO2 effects.  
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6.2 Allocation   
Issues related to allocation remain, broadly speaking, the same as for the ETS in general, with 
one exception. According to CE (2005: 85), there is a case for allocation to be made at EU level, 
at least for two reasons. First, as a result of international regulation over aviation for decades, it 
can be assumed that economic conditions for those involved in air transport are more 
homogeneous than for stationary sources. Therefore aviation might be better suited to 
harmonised allocation than stationary sources. Second, international aviation is not subject to 
the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, which gives a good reason for allowing a higher degree of 
centralisation.  
Assuming that air transport would be included in 2008, allocation would be undertaken under 
current rules, i.e. minimum 90% for free. This raises for example the issue of base year. 
According to CE (2005: 86), the aviation sector as a whole as well as aircraft and airport 
operators are highly sensitive to economic circumstances in individual countries and regions 
and to isolated local and regional events. Depending on a particular base year, the outcome of 
allocation could be very difficult. This, however, would contradict the argument that initial 
allocation should be undertaken at EU level as it would be hard to find a common base year. 
This could possibly be solved by setting a period of several years rather than a single year as a 
basis.  
 
CE (2005: 94-95) argues that the definition of new entrants would create a serious barrier to the 
application of grandfathering to aviation. The definition in aviation is more complex than in 
stationary sources. Linking the definition to either operating entities or aircrafts entering the 
scheme after allocation decisions had been taken would create incentives to circumvent the 
scheme. Restricting allowances has been discussed, ranging between €0.4 and €4.6 for a short-
haul, between €0.9-€9.0 for a medium and between €1.0 and €6.9 for long-haul flight at a price 
range of €10 to €30 per tonne of CO2. This rests however on the highly debatable assumption 
that the opportunity costs of allowances issued free of charge are not passed on to passengers. If 
they were to be passed on, the potential price increases could be seven-fold (CE, 2005). If 
opportunity costs are fully passed on, CE (2005; 138) find that the ticket price increases five-
fold.
12 As airlines – at least in intra-EU travel – are expected to be able to pass on costs, we 
should expect similar windfall profits in the magnitude of the amount of allowances received for 
free as a result of higher ticket prices without additional costs. There may, however, be a 
rerouting of intercontinental traffic as international airlines might try to avoid European hubs. 
Restricting the definition to truly new aircraft would discriminate against new air carriers 
starting out with used aircrafts.  
More practical problems include reliability and availability of entity-specific emissions data, 
which is a prerequisite for grandfathering (CE 2005: 87). Data for calculating CO2 is routinely 
collected by aircraft operators and can be estimated by EUROCONTROL. However, data 
constraints exist for contrails, cirrus clouds and to a lesser extent, NOx. If these climate impacts 
not directly correlated to fuel consumption are covered by the ETS, which would require 
examination of additional data such as routes, flight profile, and weather conditions, it would be 
difficult to determine historical emissions (CE 2005: 87, 94).  
Assuming that air transport will be included in the ETS at a later stage, say in 2012, free 
allocation is likely to create also perverse effects. Under free allocation based on historical 
emissions, the EU ETS might create incentives for airlines to increase activity and/or delay fleet 
renewal in the reference period before joining the EU ETS to get as many possible allowances 
                                                 
12 Figures would then range and ranges between €3.1 and €4.6 for a short-haul, between €6.0 and €9.0 for 
a medium and between €6.6 and €6.9 for long-haul flight at a price range of €10 to €30 per tonne of CO2. PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW – PART II | 29 
as possible. High emissions could result in a high proportion of free allowances while 
replacement of an old fleet would at the same time allow for relatively low costs abatement 
potentials. A technology benchmark could tackle the incentive to delay fleet renewal while 
addressing the incentive to increase activity rests on governments by setting the cap for the 
sector. Hence, there would be a need to reward early action. However, early action has been one 
of the most difficult areas of the first round of allocation. Another possible solution to reduce 
these perverse effects is to bring entry into the ETS forward. This however would have 
important consequences on NAPs phase II and how to treat the uncertainties of potential 
aviation emissions to be entered during an allocation period. To include aviation as of 2008 
seem to be very ambitious, given the many open questions.  
6.3  Economic effects  
Economic effects can be broken down into the effects on the European airline industry on the 
one hand and on the other, on the current covered sector. Starting with the airline sector, CE 
(2005; 136) has estimated that ticket price increases are relatively small for a number of 
different options and that most impacts would be seen by low-cost airlines. A ticket price 
increase due to the EU ETS would be proportionally higher for low-cost airlines than for higher 
cost airlines. Other airlines could eventually offset some of the higher costs in the higher price 
business class segment where price elasticity is lower. But even within this group, the effects 
will vary. Those airlines with more intra-EU travel will be more affected than those that have a 
higher proportion of intercontinental travel. Thus, those most negatively affected will first be 
the low-cost airlines, followed by regional (EU) carriers with more intra-EU business. The big 
international airlines are in all likelihood least affected (Trucost, 2004). One possible 
consequence of the bias would be leakage. Airlines may adapt their flight paths to minimise the 
distance flown in EU airspace, which could result in longer flight distances and an overall 
negative impact on fuel use and emissions (CE 2005: 73).  
The competitive position of EU airlines relative to non-EU airlines will be unlikely to be 
damaged (CE 2005: 15-16). First, all commercial aircraft flying on the covered route will 
receive equal treatment regardless of nationality of the aircraft operator or type of operation. 
Second, the impact on the size of the home market is too small to significantly affect the 
operating efficiency of EU carriers relative to non-EU carriers. Third, non-EU carriers might 
deploy their newest and cleanest aircraft on the covered routes while diverting older and less 
fuel-efficient aircraft to other routes. However, this effect may be limited by other constraints 
and commercial factors in the overall strategies of fleet management and deployment. In 
addition, aviation is less vulnerable to economic distortions to international trade than other 
sectors of the EU economy for reasons associated with the nature of the product and the market 
(CE 2005: 16). First, transport is geographically bound with passengers and freight having 
relatively fixed origins and relatively fixed destinations. Second, the air transport market is 
highly regulated by bilateral agreements that limit competition from non-EU carriers.  
It is estimated that marginal abatement costs in air transport are far higher than in the covered 
sector and may well be beyond €100 or even €150. This will make aviation mainly a buyer of 
allowances with the potential effect that the allowance prices would increase. The effect of the 
increase, however, will depend on the respective sizes of emissions between the covered sector 
and aviation. CE (2005; 16) assumes that air transport would buy around 1% of the total 
quantity of EU allowances. In principle, the impact of aviation’s entry on the EU ETS should be 
very modest. This assumes however that the trading market is efficient, notably liquid and free 
of distortions, which is not necessarily the case in a newly created market.  30 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
6.4  Environmental effects  
The environmental effect is – at least to some extent – the other side of the economic impact, 
translated through the incentive provided to economic actors. As aviation will essentially be a 
net buyer of emissions, eventual reductions will depend on the price as all reductions will need 
to be made by the current covered sector. However, as we have seen, the price in the ETS 
depends on many parameters, notably allocation (in short periods) both for the existing covered 
sectors and aviation and the development of the markets for the Kyoto Protocol’s project 
mechanisms. CE (2005) concluded that air transport volume could decrease between 0.2% and 
3% maximum, depending on the different options. As to CO2 reductions, CE (2005) concludes 
reductions of between 3% and 25% depending on the option finally chosen in a range of CO2 
prices between €10 and €30 per tonne.  
7. Concluding  remarks   
The above Part II report should be read in conjunction with Part I. Both reports concentrated on 
the changes that can be implemented ahead and during the second round of allocation. Part I 
dealt with the principal short-term implementation issues associated with allocation; such as 
transparency of NAPs, definitions, small installations, allocation methodologies, opt-ins or 
monitoring, reporting and verification and to a lesser extent with market development. This Part 
II report has moved on to address the deep-seated issues related to effectiveness, economic 
impacts, investment and aviation. Both the short-term implementation and the medium to long-
term issues associated with effectiveness, efficiency and fairness will be crucial to the future of 
the ETS and the role it can play both at EU and international level. Many of the issues that have 
been addressed in both reports will resurface in the context of the 2006 review of the EU ETS. 
All of these will be addressed in future CEPS work.  
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foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to climate 
change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with extensive 
working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems and 
opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its publications and 
the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research programme is organised 
under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
 Research Institutes (ENEPRI) The  Wider  Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS Annual Conference) and internet and media relations.